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THE BAD MAN REVISITED*
William Twiningt
On the first day of my last visit to the United States I found
myself with half-an-hour to kill in one of your most famous railroad
stations. Naturally I visited the bookstore. One of the first items to
catch my attention was a work entitled The Bust Book," written by
four young members of something called "the Movement," about
which you probably know more than I. Most of the book is devoted
to advice to participants in political demonstrations on how to behave
when confronted with what is sometimes called "The Law," but which
is referred to by a number of other terms in this particular work. The
volume contains a good deal of information and advice not normally
to be found in law books, ranging from what to wear in a demonstra-
tion to what factors to take into account when deciding whether to
conduct one's own defense in court. It more than hints at a particular
point of view. It also has pictures, the exact relevance of which is not
entirely clear.
The subtitle of The Bust Book is "What to do Until the Lawyer
Comes." It might well have been "The Bad Man-Modem Style."2
Indeed, there seems to be emerging a new genre of writing for which
such a title seems eminently suitable, including books on draft coun-
selling, manuals-flippant, semi-serious, or professional-on the manu-
facture of homemade bombs and booby traps, radical critiques of the
American judicial system, and miscellaneous pieces in the underground
press. Confronted for the first time by this new fashion in literature, I
could not help but wonder what Holmes would have thought of such
works and whether they represent an application of his Bad Man
theory. The spirit of these works does not seem to be the spirit of
Holmes, but is the underlying premise so very different? Has the Bad
Man theory now come into its own?
* This article is a revised version of a paper read to the Society for the Humanities
at Cornell University in April 1971. I am indebted to Professors Robert S. Summers,
James 0. Freedman, and Geoffrey Wilson for valuable comments on an earlier draft. The
present version does not necessarily represent their views.
t Professor of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, England. BA. 1955, Oxon.; J.D.
1958, University of Chicago; MA. 1960, Oxon.
1 K. BouniN, B. Gricx, E. RASKIN & G. RE BCACH, THE BuST BOOK (rev. ed. 1970).
2 The reference is to the Bad Man of Oliver Wendell Holmes's legal classic, "The
Path of the Law." See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897) therein-
after cited as The Path of the Law].
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Shortly thereafter I had occasion to ask a class of about forty senior
law students in a very prestigious institution how many of them had
read Holmes's "Path of the Law."3 Barely half-a-dozen claimed, or
confessed, to have done so. This article -represents a modest attempt
to keep alive interest in this legal classic, since it would be a pity if
concern for the Bad Man should be confined to subterranean circles.
For it is a classic, and not only by Mark Twain's definition of that
word as a work "which people praise and don't read." Holmes's piece
has qualities which stand the test of time: it has the capacity to survive
powerful, and sometimes valid, criticism; as circumstances change it
invites reinterpretation and fresh criticism; it continues to strike a
responsive chord among lawyers and law students who read it; and it
contains memorable phrases which have achieved the double-edged dis-
tinction of becoming cliches. Moreover, either the Bad Man is very
much alive today or there is some imposter about who deserves to be
exposed for what he is.
I
"THE PATH OF THE LAW"
Although "The Path of the Law" is often treated as a contribution
to general jurisprudence, it was intended first and foremost as a dis-
cussion of legal education. In addition to the fact that much of it
deals explicitly with legal education, the structure of the address, the
occasion, and Holmes's concerns at the time justify such an inter-
pretation.
Holmes begins as follows:
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well
known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order
to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to
keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why
people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is
that in societies like ours the command of the public force is in-
trusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the
state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments
and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and
how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find
out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then,
is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts4
a Id.
4 Id. at 457.
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The occasion was the dedication of a new hall at Boston Uni-
versity Law School, an appropriate site from which to launch a few
thinly disguised missiles at a more renowned institution located across
the river. Langdell had recently retired from the Deanship of the
Harvard Law School and, as is well known, Holmes had been a
persistent but discreet critic of Langdell's approach to law, which he
considered to be generally too redolent of the ivory tower.5 Holmes,
who was at the time still on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, treats
his audience as future practitioners of law. It is not unreasonable to
suggest that the bulk of his address is directed to the question of what
kind of legal education is best suited to the intending attorney's needs.
It is also not unreasonable to interpret his answer to this question as
being, in large part, a veiled attack on certain aspects of the philosophy
of legal education which had become established at Harvard under
Langdell's leadership and which was rapidly beginning to influence
other law schools.6
5 I finished Iangdell's Equity Jurisdiction yesterday .... It has his acumen and
patient discussion of detail, but I think brings out the narrow side of his mind,
his feebleness in philosophising, and hints at his rudimentary historical knowledge.
I think he was somewhat wanting in horse sense ....
1 HOLMEs-POLLOCK LuTrERs 140 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
Holmes's ambivalent attitude towards Langdell is further illustrated in another letter
to Pollock:
[Tjo my mind he represents the powers of darkness. He is all for logic and hates
any reference to anything outside of it, and his explanations and reconciliations
of the cases would have astonished the judges who decided them. But he is a
noble old swell whose knowledge, ability and idealist devotion to his work I
revere and love.
Id. at 17.
6 This statement is subject to a number of caveats. First, there was common ground
between Holmes and Langdell which was as significant as their differences. Holmes did
not seriously challenge langdell's famous assertion that all the available materials for the
study of law are contained in printed books. He echoes the view that "the number of
fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed" (C. LANGDELL, A
SELEcriON OF CASES ON TnE LAw OF CoTRAscrs vi (1871) (Preface)); he shares, to a large
extent, Iangdell's case-law orientation; he accepts that the study of legal history can be
of value, provided that it does not decline into antiquarianism (The Path of Law 474); he
even concedes that there has been an improvement in modes of teaching, but hastens to
add that "ability and industry will master the raw material with any mode." Id. at 477.
Second, not all of Holmes's barbs are directed against Iangdell's Harvard. It would
hardly have been appropriate to charge that institution with consistently failing to dis-
tinguish between law and morals, with overemphasizing the importance of Roman Law,
or even with regularly succumbing to the pitfalls of antiquarianism. And when Holmes
chides the "practical-minded" for undervaluing jurisprudence and the judges for failing
adequately to weigh considerations of social advantage (id. at 478), he is explicitly spread-
ing his fire quite widely.
A third, and final, caveat. Although the main focus of "The Path of the Law" is on
legal education, it does not follow that the significance of the piece is limited to that
relatively parochial topic. Worthwhile discussions of legal education often lead directly
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"The Path of the Law" is diffuse and rambling. Much of its charm
lies in its individual apergus and obiter dicta. But there is a discernible
central argument, for the core of the address is devoted to criticizing
what Holmes considered to be two fallacies: the confounding of
morality and law, and what he termed "the fallacy of the logical
form." 7 Although the main targets of Holmes's criticism were certain
ideas associated with Langdell's Harvard, at first sight only one of the
two fallacies is attributable to Langdellism, and the Bad Man plays no
part in its exposure. However, I propose to argue that in dealing with
the alleged fallacies Holmes was attacking on three main fronts, not
two, and that the main function of the Bad Man device was to expose
a basic flaw in Langdellism.
We need not spend long on that part of the attack which deals
with the idea that "the only force at work in the development of the
law is logic."" In other contexts Holmes had quite explicitly associated
this idea with Langdell;9 here he is content to say that this is "the
natural error of the schools, but it is not confined to them."'1 Holmes's
arguments for bringing into the open the unarticulated policy as-
sumptions embedded in legal reasoning and his plea for a closer
integration of law and economics are well known." For present purposes
it is sufficient to note that the Bad Man plays no part in this par-
ticular argument.
to the questioning of accepted theoretical assumptions, and Holmes's address is not a
unique example of provocative jurisprudential statements stimulated by educational
concerns. There has been, especially in America, a dose connection, both historical and
analytical, between legal theory and discussions of legal education. It is not necessary to
expound a theory of law every time one talks or writes about curriculum changes or
professional training, but any such discussion presupposes at least some assumptions about
law and lawyers (or law-trained people). See text following note 15 infra. Often intro-
spection on the part of legal educators leads them straight back to consideration of
fundamentals. Further, as a matter of history, a significant amount of legal theorizing in
the United States over the past 100 years has been stimulated in large part by educational
concerns--witness, for example, the early theoretical writings of Corbin, Llewellyn, Lass-
well, McDougal, and, to a lesser extent, Jerome Frank. See generally Comment, Legal
Theory and Legal Education, 79 YAIZ L.J. 1153 (1970).
7 The Path of the Law 468.
The relationship between law and morals and the place of logic in law are familiar
topics to students of jurisprudence; some issues concerning them are perennial subjects
of controversy. I do not propose to deal with these issues here, except as they have a
direct bearing on the concept of the Bad Man.
8 Id. at 465.
9 See note 5 supra.
I' The Path of the Law 465.
11 "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics."
Id. at 469. "[Every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics." Id. at 474.
[Vol. 58:275
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Holmes's second line of attack deals with the confusion of law
and morality, and the related, but not identical, error of failing to
distinguish law as it is from law as it ought to be. Rather than identify
particular offenders, Holmes is content to remark that the error "some-
times rises to the height of conscious theory, and more often and
indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without reaching the
point of consciousness. 12 The Bad Man is introduced ostensibly as a
device to clear up the confusion. Holmes's point is that whereas the
good and law-abiding citizen who looks to both morality and law to
tell him how he ought to behave may not distinguish clearly between
legal sanctions and "the vaguer sanctions of conscience,"' 3 the Bad
Man is indifferent to morality (including its sanctions) and is only
interested in the actual consequences of his actions. He has a practical
reason for observing the distinction between law and morality. In
other words, while the Good Citizen asks "How should I behave?,"
the Bad Man inquires "What will happen to me if I embark on this
course of action?"
Perhaps it is because the Bad Man's question is in the form of a
request for a prediction that Holmes was led to link the distinction
between law and morality to the idea of prophecy.
The confusion with which I am dealing besets confessedly
legal conceptions. Take the fundamental question, What constitutes
the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is some-
thing different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts
or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from
principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or
may not coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our
friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws
for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what
the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am
much of his mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.' 4
This passage is one of the most quoted and criticized in all Ameri-
can jurisprudence. It is often treated as the locus classicus of the so-
called prediction theory of law.15 Given the context and Holmes's
objectives, there is a suggestion of hyperbole in treating it as out-
12 Id. at 459. It is unlikely that Holmes considered Langdell to be a prime offender
in this respect.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 460-61.
15 See, e.g., E. PAMtESON, JURISPRUDENCE 118-22 (1953); W. RuBmmE, Armacm LEGAL
REALsm 41-44 (1968); cf. H.LA. HART, Tim CONCEPr OF LAW (1961); G. PATON, JuRis-
PRUDENCE (2d ed. 1951).
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lining a general theory of law. By. purporting to answer the question
"What constitutes the law?," he could be said to have been advancing
a definition of law or even an embryonic theory of law, and thus to
have invited criticism on this basis. But it was not an essential part
of his argument. It is not necessary to outline a theory of law every
time one talks or writes about legal education, although it is often
important to make one's assumptions explicit in such contexts.
Holmes's main arguments did not depend upon defining law in terms
of prophecies or predictions. The gist of his educational thesis would
have been unaffected if he had adopted, for example, Austin's analysis
of the concept of law.'6 The quoted passage, read in context, is best
treated as a dramatic or rhetorical device rather than as a necessary
step in Holmes's argument. Yet the Bad Man and the idea of predic-
tion play an important part in his thesis. Holmes did not himself
develop these ideas at length either in "The Path of the Law" or in
his other writings. More recently, however, the idea of prediction has
regained a central place in discussions of the concept of law, and the
Bad Man has become a not inconsiderable character in juristic liter-
ature. 7 Accordingly, at the risk of being charged with reading too
much into Holmes, I propose to consider first, the significance of the
Bad Man for legal theory; second, the significance of the main argu-
ments in "The Path of the Law" for legal education; and, finally, the
connections, if any, between Holmes's Bad Man and the addressees
of The Bust Book.
II
Tim BAD MAN AND LEGAL THmoRY
A. Who is the Bad Man?
In the present context, the Bad Man is not a revolutionary nor
even a reformer out to change "the system." The Bad Man's concern
is to secure his personal objectives within the existing order as pain-
lessly as possible; he is not so much alienated from the law as he is
indifferent to all aspects which do not affect him personally. Unlike
Sartre's Saint Gen&, he is not one who has a problem of identity-
who defines his being in terms of the system and who is driven to do
acts because they are criminal or antisocial."" Nor is he a subscriber to
16 See J. AusrN, TnE PROViNcE oF JUmpRUDENcE DErERmiNED 82-83 (1954).
17 See L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QuEsT oF ITsEI. 92-95 (1940).
-18 J.p. SARTRE, SAINT GENT 66-67 (B. Frechtman transl. 1963).
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some perverse ethic which turns conventional morality upon its head.
The Bad Man is amoral rather than immoral. He is, like Economic
Man and Bentham's "civilized" actors, a rational, calculating creature.
In this and in other respects he does not necessarily reflect in a realistic
manner the characteristics of actual deviants. Like Dahrendorf's homo
sociologicus, he "can neither love nor hate, laugh nor cry. He remains a
pale, incomplete, strange, artificial man."19 Indeed, there appears to be
no reason why the Bad Man should not be an artificial person, such
as a corporation. In short, he is a theoretical construct with as yet
unexplored potential as a tool of analysis.
Perhaps we can go a little further and suggest that the Bad Man
can be defined in terms of prediction. He is the person whose only
task is to predict what will happen to him if he embarks on some
particular course of action. Here we may anticipate a possible objec-
tion. Although it may be granted that prediction is central to the role
of the Bad Man, it is admitted that there are others who are similarly
concerned-for example, the lawyer who has to decide whether it is
worth appealing an adverse decision, the advocate who needs to predict
how the personnel of a particular court will react to some line of
argument or to the testimony of some witness, the judge who may wish
to predict the likelihood of reversal on appeal or the possible effects
of sending an offender to jail, the legislator who is concerned with the
likely effects of a legal provision on patterns of behavior. And the
scientist-is he not also concerned with prediction?
A simple response is that although these may all be valid ob-
servations, they are not objections to defining the Bad Man in terms
of prediction. A comprehensive prediction theory would need to
give a comprehensive answer to a question such as "Who is concerned
with predicting what events at what point in time for what purposes
using what means?" With the exception of the scientist, whose stand-
point raises special difficulties, all the other characters are predicting
as part of some other task; for example, the advocate predicts in order
to perform the task of persuasion. For some purposes it may be useful
to isolate the task of predicting simpliciter; for other purposes pre-
diction is more usefully seen as part of a cluster of tasks. In other
words, the Bad Man is a device for isolating for special consideration
the task of predicting certain kinds of events.
The idea of prediction provides no basis for distinguishing be-
19 R. DAHRENDOPF, Homo Sociologicus, in EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF SocITry 76 (1968).
This essay explores at length the relationship between constructs like homo sociologicus
and actual people. See also H. LAsswELL 9- A. KAPLAN, PowER AND SociLr 78 (1950).
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tween the standpoints of the Good Citizen and of the Bad Man. It is
not incompatible with good citizenship to be concerned with predict-
ing the likely consequences of one's actions. The Bad Man, however, is
affected by guidance as to his actions only insofar as such guidance pre-
dicts the ultimate consequences of those actions. Take, for example,
the situation of a law-abiding individual seeking advice on his liability
to pay income tax. If his conscience permits him to make a clear dis-
tinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion (as far as the law recog-
nizes such a distinction), he may ask what lawful course of action will
leave him with the most money. If he has a tender social conscience,
he may reject certain kinds of lawful avoidance devices as immoral;
nevertheless, he may wish to predict what his net income is likely to be.
There may also be occasions when the Good Citizen can be said to have
a moral duty to predict the likely consequences of his actions. The dif-
ference between the Bad Man and the Good Citizen does not rest on the
latter's indifference to prediction, but on the former's indifference to
morality.
Of course, the distinction between law and morality is not ex-
clusively the concern of the Bad Man. Bentham's legislator draws a
sharp distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be. State-
ments such as "This is a court of law, not of morals" are commonplace;
typically, those who are concerned with analyzing and expounding legal
doctrine draw similar distinctions. What distinguishes the standpoint
of the Bad Man from the standpoint of the legislator, the judge, and
the advocate is his exclusive concern with prediction; however, in this
respect the standpoint of the Bad Man is very close to that of the Good
Citizen and to that of the legal advisers of both of them.
Thus, the Bad Man has two characteristics: his badness and his citi-
zenship.2 The distinction between law and morality is related to the
former characteristic, the idea of prediction to the latter. When Holmes
advised his audience to adopt the standpoint of the Bad Man, he was
not seriously urging them to use the Bad Man as an ethical model;
rather, he was suggesting that they look at law from the perspective of a
citizen who is concerned with predicting the consequences of his ac-
tions. He was in effect saying that as intending private practitioners of
law they should put themselves in the shoes of the legal adviser of citi-
zens, good or bad. From that standpoint their main concern should be
with prediction.
20 "Citizenship" as used here refers to the condition of being subject to the laws of a
particular legal system rather than to nationality or legal status.
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B. What Events Does the Bad Man Desire To Predict?
According to Holmes, the Bad Man is anxious to predict what the
"courts will do in fact."21 Even if we allow that by "do," Holmes refers
not only to judicial decisions on questions of fact and law, but also to
the sanctions courts are likely to impose, this still seems to be an unduly
restrictive answer. Such a response reflects, perhaps, a court-centeredness
on Holmes's part, with possible overtones of "appellate court-itis. 22
Suppose, for example, that our friend the Bad Man is in Boston
(or Cambridge) wondering whether or not to do some specific act. He
may ask, "What are the chances that a Massachusetts court would hold
this type of act to be criminal?" But this is only one of a series of ques-
tions pertinent to the decision whether or not to do the act. He needs
to estimate the likelihood of the authorities discovering the commission
of the act; how energetically, if at all, they are likely to investigate it
and other matters related to detection and apprehension; if appre-
hended, whether there will be a decision to prosecute and, if so, the
likelihood of conviction; the likely effect of pleading guilty or not
guilty; and the probable nature of the sanction if he is convicted. If
he wants to follow the total process through, the Bad Man may also
need to consider a whole range of possible post-conviction decisions.
The decisions of courts are merely a single phase in what Lasswell
terms a "flow of determinative activities" which go to make up the
total process which may affect the Bad Man.28 And, of course, if one is
talking about actual people who are in danger of being "busted," not
only do they need to predict a wider range of possible events, but they
also need to perform tasks other than prediction.24 A comprehensive
picture of legal process on the Holmesian model would take all of
these considerations into account.25
21 The Path of the Law 461.
22 Cf. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 222-24 (1949). The broadening of the focus of at-
tention to include all officials was suggested by Karl Llewellyn. See K. LLwELLYN, A
Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE 16-18 (1962).
23 H. LAsswELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 81; see McDougal, The Comparative
Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic
World Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915, 921 (1952). See generally text accompanying note 42 infra.
24 Thus, for example, The Bust Book is addressed to people who are presumed to
have political aims which they are advised to bear in mind at each stage of their en-
counters with "the system."
25 Holmes never fully developed such a comprehensive picture, although he is some-
times treated as if he had. At least he is treated, especially by critics, as being primarily
responsible for the so-called prediction theory of law. The Bad Man passage (see text
accompanying note 4 supra) is a somewhat slender pedestal for such a target, but it is not
enough to dismiss the critics merely by suggesting that they have succumbed too easily to
the temptation of elevating what they have sought to attack.
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C. Criticisms of the Bad Man Concept as a Theory of Law
One standard criticism of the Bad Man passage is that concepts
like "court" or "official" presuppose the idea of a legal system. They
are, it is said, rule-defined concepts. To purport to define or elucidate
"law" in terms of prophecies or predictions of what courts or officials
will do involves an element of circularity, for the terms "court" and
"official" must themselves be defined in terms of law. Thus Holmes's
statement is inadequate as a general definition of law (and, if it de-
serves to be so treated, as a theory of law in the restricted sense).28
Another standard criticism of the so-called prediction theory of
law is that it confuses the notion of prediction with the notion of rule.
The point is simply illustrated by reference to the proposition "In cir-
cumstances X there is a duty not to .... ." To say that such a proposi-
tion is a prediction or a prophecy involves a distortion of ordinary
language and is likely to lead to confused thinking. In ordinary usage
the statement "Y has a duty" means "Y ought"; it is a normative propo-
sition, whereas a prediction is an empirical statement which is, inter
alia, capable of verification. To equate rules with predictions blurs
useful distinctions, such as the distinction between the existence of a
rule and its actual enforcement. It also may lead to misdescription of
situations in which rules in fact influence behavior. Furthermore, it
obscures the point that many concepts take their meaning from legal
rules.
Such an analysis is valid and important, but it is not necessarily
applicable to "The Path of the Law," since Holmes limits his discussion
to the standpoint of the Bad Man, who is, by definition, unconcerned
with the normative. It may well be, however, that some followers of
Holmes are vulnerable to this criticism. Another way of making the
same point is to say that to equate rules with predictions is to confuse
rules with roles or tasks involving the use of rules. Although a rule is
a normative proposition, it can be used as an aid to making predictions.
But rules have a variety of uses. The Bad Man may use propositions of
law (statements of legal rules) as aids to predicting the likely conse-
quences of his actions, but the Good Citizen also uses them as guides
to correct behavior; the judge may use them as a guide to deciding
and may invoke them to justify his decision; and the legislator may
formulate rules to control, regulate, or guide behavior and expecta-
tions, and perhaps to educate or to assert some moral standard. Con-
versely, even in predicting the outcomes of court decisions the Bad
28 On "theory of law," see note 86 infra; on "officials," see generally the works cited
in note 22 supra.
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Man and his advisers may resort to other aids in addition to or instead
of formulations of legal rules. When predicting other phases of legal
process, such as decisions whether or not to prosecute a suspected of-
fender, resort to other aids to prediction will be essential. Rules are
only one of the Bad Man's aids to prediction, and predicting is only
one of the uses of rules.
A third criticism, closely related to the others, is that the predic-
tion theory is inadequate as a theory of law because it does not take
into account the standpoints of other participants in legal processes,
such as the judge, the advocate, and the legislator.27 What is particu-
larly interesting about this criticism is its assumptions about the con-
cept of an adequate general theory of law and, related to this, its seem-
ing acceptance of a switch from a traditional model of law as a system
of rules to a model of legal process as a system of roles.
The first assumption is that an adequate general theory of law
must take into account a variety of standpoints. What is meant by
standpoint (or its approximate synonym "point of view") in this con-
text? In ordinary usage it is possible to identify several primary, but
related, meanings of these terms. 28 First, standpoint may refer to van-
tage point or point of view in an observational sense, for example,
as "a vantage point of the sort that a photographer might seek."29
Second, adopting a standpoint or point of view may be a matter of
adopting some principle or ideology or intellectual system, as when
someone approaches a subject from the standpoint of a utilitarian or
a Marxist. Similarly, standpoints are sometimes distinguished by ref-
erence to disciplines or specialized fields of expertise, as in the expres-
sion "from the standpoint of an economist" (or an anthropologist or a
moral philosopher). Typically in such usages the viewer is seeking to
understand, describe, depict, interpret, analyze, or explain the subject
of his viewing without necessarily having any immediate practical ob-
jectives in mind.30 Third, standpoint may be defined in terms of some
27 As an indicator of some of the limitations of the Bad Man theory, this is obviously
correct. It is another matter whether or not it is a fair criticism of Holmes, who identified
himself with the Bad Man for a specific purpose. For an incisive account of Holmes's
stance in other contexts, see Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 213 (1964).
28 For a useful general discusion, see Moline, On Points of View, 5 AM. PHILosoPHiC.AL
Q. 191 (1968). See also Summers, Notes on Criticism in Legal Philosophy, in MoRE EssAYs
IN LEGAL PHILosopHY 8-11 (R. Summers ed. 1971).
29 Moline, supra note 28, at 192; see note 3 infra.
80 We might categorize these first two usages as referring to observer standpoints, as
contrasted with participant standpoints. The distinction between observers and participants
is emphasized by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal in their forthcoming work,
Law, Science and Policy. See H. I.Asswra. & M. McDouGAL, LAw, SCIENCE AND PoracY
1973]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
task or role or objective.3' Often such tasks or roles or objectives are
expressed as personifications, such as "the legislator," "the advocate,"
or "the judge.13 2 The Bad Man, as here interpreted, is an example of
such a construct. To investigate law "from the standpoint of the Bad
Man" can mean to investigate what the Bad Man needs to know and
to understand in order to be able to make effective predictions to
further his own ends. Standpoint in this third sense implies some
criteria of relevance determined by the conception of the task or role
or objective in question. Thus, "the standpoint of the judge" assumes
some more or less clearly defined notion of "the judge's role" which
provides, inter alia, a basis for determining what the judge needs to
know and to understand in order to do his job, as he or as others con-
ceive it.
These three primary usages sometimes coalesce when the stand-
point in question is that of an actual or imaginary person or class of
persons. For example, "the standpoint of a typical Wall Street lawyer"
may encompass not only what such a person needs to know in order
satisfactorily to do his job, but also what he has the opportunity to
observe by virtue of his special vantage point. Furthermore, for us to
assume such a standpoint may (or may not) require that we adopt the
ethos and attitudes of people who typically occupy such positions. It
would be useful to treat this as a fourth and distinct usage of stand-
point, if only to emphasize the lack of precision of ordinary usages of
the term.83 Moreover, it is only too easy to confuse notional constructs
(forthcoming). In some contexts the distinction is difficult to maintain. See, e.g., L. WiLINs,
SocIAL DEviANC E passim (1964); THE PARTIcIPANT OBsxavER passim (G. Jacobs ed. 1970).
31 See generally M. BANTON, ROLES: AN INTRODUGION TO THE STUDY OF SocIAL
RELATIONS (1965); R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 19; N. GROSS, W. MASON & A. McEARcHERN,
EXPLORATIONS IN ROLE ANALYSIS (1958); Nieman & Hughes, The Problem of the Concept
of Role-A Re-survey of the Literature, 30 SoCALL FoRcEs 141 (1951); Seidman, The
Judicial Process Reconsidered in the Light of Role-Theory, 32 MODERN L. REV. 516 (1969).
32 For a typically confused example of such use of standpoint, see 2 R. POuND,
JURiSPRuDENCE 129-32 (1959).
83 There is admittedly a close and complex relationship between the various usages
of standpoint discussed in the text. Nevertheless, failure to distinguish between them in
legal contexts may lead to confusion. For example, an English solicitor may in the course
of his practice have an opportunity to learn a great deal about property values in his
locality, yet he may not consider it as part of his role to advise a client on the value of a
particular piece of property. Similarly, a solicitor may have ample opportunity to observe
the functioning of property law in practice. On the basis of such observation he may con-
clude that the law is either in need of change or in need of preservation from attempts to
reform it. In short, he may be qualified by his experience to contribute to law reform
activities, and thus to share in the tasks of the legislator. He may, however, take the
position that such reform is "none of his business," if in his opinion the job of the
solicitor is to work within the existing system, not to change it; on the other hand, he
may claim that when participating in law reforming activities he is acting in his capacity
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which are defined in terms of some particular role or task (e.g., the leg-
islator defined in terms of the task of making rules of law) with
stereotypes of actual people (e.g., the legislator defined in terms of
membership in some particular legislative body). This distinction,
facilitated by an understanding of the fourth use of standpoint, is
important because in real life few persons have roles which consist of
a single type of task, and few functionaries have a monopoly on partic-
ular tasks. Thus, in the United States judges sometimes legislate (i.e.,
participate in making legal rules), and legislators are often called upon
to advise, persuade, and predict.
The concept of standpoint may be used with reference either to
constructs personifying particular tasks or groups of tasks (e.g., "the
legislator") or to actual or imagined people (e.g., Wall Street lawyers).
The former conception is more intellectualized and accordingly more
susceptible to rigorous development; the latter may be used to promote
a more realistic identification with typical participants in actual pro-
cesses. In "The Path of the Law" this distinction is glossed over. The
latent function of the Bad Man in Holmes's argument is to support a
plea for a more realistic identification on the part of law students and
law teachers with the problems of practicing lawyers. But, as we
have seen, the Bad Man is much more plausibly treated as a personifi-
cation of the task of predicting decisions (which is only one of many
tasks performed by practicing lawyers) than as a realistic stereotype of
any kind of actual person.34 Thus, the third and fourth usages of stand-
point are directly relevant to an analysis of "The Path of the Law,"
although the first two should be kept in mind.
D. The Significance of Standpoint
The distinctions between the four usages of standpoint may help
to clarify some obscurities in the expressions "the Bad Man theory (of
law)" and "the prediction theory (of law)." Several possible meanings
are attributable to these terms. First, either can be used to refer to a
general definition of law in terms of prediction. Apparently this is
what is meant when the prediction theory is criticized along
the lines considered above.3 5 The standard criticisms reveal some of
the inadequacies of Holmes's dictum thus viewed, but it is stretching
as citizen and not qua solicitor. Alternatively, he may claim that by virtue of his experi-
ences as a solicitor he is particularly well qualified to participate in law reform. One
starting point for analyzing such claims is to clarify underlying assumptions about stand-
point and role.
84 See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
85 See notes 26-34 and accompanying text supra.
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,the term to treat this statement as encapsulating a theory of law.36 A
second possible meaning of the Bad Man theory, or the prediction
theory, relates to standpoint in the third sense insofar as these theories
attempt to provide a working theory for predictors. Taken this way
the phrases represent a general account of what the Bad Man needs to
know and to understand in order to make reliable predictions (includ-
ing perhaps some general advice by way of guidelines or rules of thumb
on how to go about the task of predicting). This is a perfectly plausible
usage. Holmes, however, certainly did not produce such an account
(nor drop more than the slightest of hints as to what it might contain),
nor, as far as I know, has anyone else attempted to do so in a systematic
fashion.37
A third possible meaning of the Bad Man theory (but less plausi-
bly of the prediction theory) is a descriptive account of what law in
general (or within a particular legal system) looks like from the stand-
point of a Bad Man. Here, since standpoint is being used in the ob-
servational sense, it does not seem appropriate to define the Bad Man
in terms of prediction;38 indeed, there is considerable doubt as to who
the Bad Man might be in this context and as to what exactly would be
his vantage point. A work by Gent or a professional burglar or
a member of the I.R.A. might qualify under this heading, as might a
descriptive work by the authors of The Bust Book or by a trained ob-
server occupying a similar vantage point. Such worms' eye views are
potentially of great interest since they represent perspectives which
have been largely neglected by jurists. It is dangerous to generalize
about such views, however, for there are many species of worms with
different observational capacities who may be viewing for a variety of
86 One source of confusion relating to the prediction theory is attributable to the
obscurity of the term "theory of law." Sometimes that term is restricted to attempts to
elucidate the concepts of "law" and "legal system"; sometimes it is used vaguely to refer
to the corpus of a jurist's more general ideas; sometimes it may be loosely equated with
theorizing about law, or legal theory, and may be applied indiscriminately to any inquiry
of a general nature about or related to law. Failure to distinguish between the restricted
sense of a "theory of law"-or "theory of legal system" (see J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT O A
LEGAL SYsTaM 1-4 (1970))-and legal theory (or theorizing about law) in general can be a
potent source of confusion, not least because it easily leads to the error of assuming that
all jurists have been addressing themselves to identical questions and that all legal theories
are comparables. It is far from dear in what sense the prediction theory could be said
to be a "theory of law," even if it were developed more fully than Holmes ever attempted
to develop it.
37 Karl Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition can be viewed as a handbook for
predicting appellate court decisions, but not for predicting the outcome of legal processes
in general. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, Tim COMMON LAW TAorrsON (1960); W. TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALISr MOVEMENT (forthcoming).
88 See text following note 19 supra.
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purposes or who may, under the guise of viewing, be doing something
else such as calling for help or advocating a cause. Thus, the Bad Man
theory in the descriptive sense is an intriguing, if somewhat open-
ended, category.
Finally, the Bad Man theory may be used in an ideological sense,
corresponding to the second usage of standpoint. Again it is necessary
to ask who exactly the Bad Man is in this context. He might be an
ethical nihilist or a disciple of Nietzsche or de Sade or some kind of
revolutionary or anarchist, labelled "Bad" because he is seen as an
enemy of the established order. Certainly there is ample scope for
theorizing from this type of standpoint, but such theorizing, perhaps
not surprisingly, is not currently accorded much attention in orthodox
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Thus, although this may be a plausible
meaning of the Bad Man theory, it is not an adequate interpretation
of Holmes.
We return, at last, to the criticism that the prediction theory is
inadequate not because it is wrong, but because it is incomplete.39
The argument is that while the Bad Man's desire is to predict, other
participants have additional tasks, such as to persuade, to decide, to
advise, to justify, to regulate behavior, and to channel expectations.
What would a complete theory dealing with these points include?
Without attempting a definitive answer, I would suggest that were
we to take the idea of completeness literally, then the standpoints of all
participants in legal process would need to be accommodated and the
relationships among them indicated. In addition, we might wish to
add the standpoints of people outside the process, as, for example, the
observer who is not also a participant (i.e., the scientist?), and ulti-
mately (raising questions which here I deliberately bypass) the stand-
point of God.40
39 See text following note 27 supra.
40 Another aspect of the argument about completeness assumes that a "complete"
theory must accommodate a number of working theories. Presumably in this context an
adequate theory for the Bad Man is one which provides him with the means to understand
the nature of his situation, and furnishes him with an indication of the kind of information
on which to base his predictions, and of the kind of skills requisite to making effective
calculations. Terms such as "theory," "understanding," "information," and "skills"
require further analysis, but in the present context it may suffice to define a working
theory as a set of operative ideas which can give a participant at least general guidance
on how he can most effectively perform his tasks or pursue his objectives. Without de-
veloping the point here, I think that the idea of a complete theory as one which accom-
modates not only the non-participant theories of observers and scientists (whoever they
may be), but also the working theories of participants in legal process, is one which is
worth developing in jurisprudence. Among other things, it may provide a basis for
establishing a healthier relationship between theory and practice.
1973]
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Developing such a model need not be as ambitious an undertaking
as might at first sight appear.41 It would be a very ambitious under-
taking to attempt to provide a "complete" description of a legal system
along these lines, let alone to provide a complete description of all legal
systems. But to set up a model for describing and analyzing legal process
in terms of the flow of decisions and of the varying tasks and roles
of participants at each stage in the process is a more straightforward
enterprise. Indeed, when we talk of "the legislator," "the judge," "the
advocate," "the prosecutor,' and "the citizen" (Good or Bad) and his
advisers, we are assuming a crude version of such a model. This flow-
chart of the main decisions relating to the Bad Man's escapade in
Boston42 is an elementary example of a way of analyzing one type of
legal process along these lines:
S hal- -i" " Decision Decision of Not Guilty
Act? to ProsecuteC r
Seekl Plea Guilty
Professional B a__i
Advice
Decision o Chof e t
to Act
to-Plead Gult
No
DecisIons ot Gultyc.sson
eltn oPost- of
, _ _-i a_ ./ C on v i c t i on A p p e a l
d Detection Tr l Decisions Court
This is, of course, a very simple example of a model of one type of
legal process. An adequate model for depicting and analyzing the total-
ity of legal processes in the United States would obviously be much
more complicated. I do not propose to develop such a model here, but
it is worth making certain points about this kind of analysis. First, it
is important in constructing such models and charts to bear in mind
the distinction between general and particular jurisprudence. A chart
may take certain things for granted which are not necessary or charac-
teristic features of all legal systems. For example, it may assume that
there are advisers and prosecutors, as well as the possibility of pleading
guilty or not guilty, and provision for appeal. These are neither neces-
sary nor universal features of legal process in all systems, although such
features would be appropriate in most kinds of criminal process models
in England and the United States. If a chart were to be expanded it
41 See generally H. LAssiWLL & M. MCDOUGAL, supra note 80; Twining, Pericles and
the Plumber, 83 L.Q. REV. 396, 412-15 (1967).
42 See generally text accompanying note 23 supra.
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would tend to become more particularized and thereby more closely
linked to one actual system. Indeed, the building up of more and more
detailed charts of this kind would be a revealing way of comparing
and contrasting criminal processes in two or more legal systems.
Analysis of legal process in terms of decisions, tasks, and roles is
not an alternative to a model of legal system as a system of rules (or
rules and principles).43 It is not strictly speaking a theory of law, but
rather presupposes such a theory; the concept of "legal process"
assumes some concept of "law" and "legal system." Thus a "complete
theory," as that term is used in criticizing the Bad Man theory, is best
treated not as a theory of law, but as a model or ideal type of process
within a legal system. As such it is a tool of analysis to be evaluated in
terms of its utility.44
A model of legal system as a system of rules and a model of legal
process as a system of roles need not be viewed as inconsistent or com-
peting models, Each may be useful for certain purposes, although a par-
ticular model may, of course, be over-used or have an "overspill" effect
which may be open to criticism. For example, much of the unease of
American jurists with the rule model may be based on the feeling that
it has exerted undue and unsalutary influence on the consideration of
matters which are marginally related to basic questions about the
nature of law, and that it has been used to provide criteria of relevance
which are too narrow for particular purposes. A simple example of
this overspill effect is found, once again, in legal education; the study
of law has too often been equated with the study of legal doctrine. To
suggest that it is important to study the role conceptions of lawyers
and judges or the effects of laws is even today sometimes met with the
reaction: "That's not law, that's sociology."" The identification of law
solely with legal doctrine has led to literature, teaching, and talk that
have repeatedly been characterized as "narrow," "sterile," or "un-
realistic." Insofar as participants in legal processes and other affected
people complain that too many of their concerns have been left un-
explored, and that too many of their questions have been left un-
answered by academic lawyers, their complaints are justified. The gist
of their complaint is that for their purposes different criteria of rele-
43 See Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in EssAYs W LEGAL mLosopny 25
(R. Summers ed. 1968). The differences between Hart and Dworkin on this question are
not at issue here.
44 See R. BmwxX, MAX WEBER:.AN vIELLFCWAL PoRTRArT 274-75 (1962); cf. M. BLAca,
MoDE's AND METAPHORS 219-43 (1962).
45 Such statements may be more common in the United Kingdom than in the United
States.
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vance are required. A model of legal process developed around the
concept of standpoint, it is suggested, is likely to provide a more satis-
factory theoretical basis for such criteria than that provided by models
of legal system as a system of rules (or rules and principles).46 This is
not to reject such theories. It is only to put them in their place.47
E. Summary
The "Path of the Law" is often treated as the locus classicus of
the prediction theory of law. This theory, despite its ambiguity, is
embryonic in character, and its vulnerability to elementary criticism
seems to continue to attract at least two classes of persons: those who
feel that the traditional approaches to law exhibited in juristic writing,
legal literature, legal research, and legal education tend to be too
academic or unrealistic or divorced from the realities of the law in
action; and those who find that much of the theorizing of analytical
jurists from Austin to Hart is narrow or sterile, or, again, remote from
reality. Although demands for greater practicality and demands for a
broader approach to law are by no means identical, they reflect a felt
need for a theoretical framework which accords to such notions as
process, role, function, official, institution, decision, and technique an
important place in juristic analysis alongside traditional notions such
as sovereignty, sanction, authority, rule, and duty.
A crucial reason for the continued attractiveness of "The Path of
the Law" as a contribution to legal theory is that Holmes made an
effective, although elementary, switch of standpoint; its main weak-
ness as a contribution to legal theory is that his analysis was not
developed in a systematic fashion. A key to finding a satisfactory theo-
retical basis for demands for more realistic or for broader approaches
to law is to develop models of legal system and legal process which
accommodate at least the principal standpoints of participants in legal
processes. These standpoints can be defined either in terms of specific
tasks (e.g., rule-making, rule-interpreting, fact-finding, persuading, and
predicting) or in terms of typical functionaries who in practice often
have overlapping and imprecisely defined roles (e.g., judges, legislators,
46 See Dworkin, supra note 43.
47 What is suggested here is not that attempts to elucidate the concept of law in
terms of systems of rules--or rules-and-principles (see id.)-have been misconceived or
mistaken, but rather that such theories of law have sometimes been used to provide or to
justify inappropriately narrow criteria of relevance in other contexts. To conceive of law
as a system of rules does not involve commitment to a narrow approach to legal literature
or legal education as a matter of logical necessity, but it may in fact encourage such an
approach.
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and advocates). Such models of legal process are not an alternative to,
but rather presuppose, a model of legal system as a system of rules (or
rules and principles).
III
Tim BAD MAN AND LEGAL EDUCATION
In the United States concern with legal education has often been
both a stimulus to and a testing ground for general theorizing about
law. "The Path of the Law" exemplifies this tendency. Two major
themes have dominated American discussions of legal education since
Holmes: the search for ways of developing a more efficient and realistic
system of preparation for legal practice, and the desire for a closer
integration of law and the social sciences. 48 A close connection between
these objectives is often taken for granted, although the exact nature
of this connection is not always made clear. Both themes are recog-
nizable in "The Path of the Law," where their compatibility is assumed
rather than demonstrated. I propose to argue that in advocating a
switch of standpoint, Holmes pinpointed a crucial weakness in Lang-
dell's educational theory, but that largely because he failed to pursue
the implications of such a switch, his own prescriptions for legal edu-
cation did not provide the basis for a viable alternative. In particular,
by failing to identify precisely what standpoint(s) might be suitable as
the basis for a working theory of legal education, Holmes was able to
beg some crucial questions, including questions about the relationship
between these two themes.
Demands for a more efficient and realistic system of preparation
for practice typically emanate from legal practitioners, who have not
always been their own best advocates in this cause. Poor diagnosis, naive
prescription, a lack of appreciation of educational problems-peda-
gogical, financial, and administrative-and more than a hint of anti-
intellectualism have often spoiled the presentation of a potentially
strong case. The American legal profession has been distinctive in
having had over the years a number of men of stature, such as Holmes
and Frank, who have performed the function of spokesmen for the pro-
fession in a manner which exempts them from charges of crude anti-
intellectualism. From one perspective "The Path of the Law" is a pow-
erful statement of the practicing lawyer's complaint against academic
48 See generally W. TWINING, supra note 37; Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The Amer-
ican Law School, in 5 PERsPECrivzs IN AMERICAN HISTORY 405 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds.
1971
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law in general and against Langdellism in particular. The essence of
the complaint is that Langdell and his disciples adopted inappropriate
criteria of relevance in their approach to teaching, research, and writ-
ing. In such an interpretation the Bad Man serves as a device for
dramatizing a plea for the adoption of a more realistic standpoint.
What was the standpoint assumed by Langdellism? In his most
famous formulation Langdell identified it with "the true lawyer,"
who has a mastery of legal principles and an ability "to apply them
with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human
affairs." 49 As has often been pointed out, Langdell's "true lawyer" is
a far from realistic stereotype of actual private practitioners. His as-
sumed criteria of relevance are almost identical with those adopted
by appellate court judges in their task of expounding, interpreting,
and applying the law to given sets of facts.Y0 These criteria are different
from, and generally much more restricted than, those of office or trial
lawyers. In this context the charge of narrowness is apposite.51
49 C. LANODELL, supra note 6, at vi (Preface).
50 See Megarry, Law as Taught and Law as Practised, 9 J. Soc'Y PuB. TEmcemns L.
176, 176-78 (1966).
51 Of course, Langdell was not a lone offender in this respect. Indeed, his reforms at
Harvard represent an important stride away from what might be termed the textbook
tradition of legal education. As a product of a system which was in certain respects pre-
Langdellian, I can give examples from personal experience of the consequences of adopt-
ing a standpoint which is closer to appellate court adjudication than to "Bad Mansman-
ship." For example, my only exposure as a student to the important subject of compensa-
tion for personal injuries occurred in a course called "Torts." We were encouraged to buy
one of the leading textbooks on the subject, and to read a large number of reports of
decisions of appellate courts as well as a few learned articles, almost all of which adopted
similar criteria of relevance. The main textbook which I used was Salmond. See
J. SALMoND, TnE LAW OF ToRrs (11th ed. R. Heuston ed. 1953). It still flourishes and it is
in many respects an admirable work. Salmond's treatise was quite informative and lucid
about the ingredients of liability in the tort of negligence and about the various defenses,
but it was silent on a great many matters that an English solicitor would want to know
when handling a personal injury claim. There was, for example, no mention of the fact
that in England only about 2% of such claims are determined by a judgment of a court
and that the vast majority of the remainder (approximately 80% according to a recent
survey) are settled or abandoned even before the issuance of a writ. See P. AiTYAH, Acci-
DENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 281-304 (1970); T. IsoN, TE FORENSIC LOTERY 115,
155 (1967). There was no indication of the factors which make the pursuit of such claims
what has been aptly called "a forensic lottery" (T. IsoN, supra); there was almost no dis-
cussion of the relationship of the common law action for negligence to other compensa-
tion processes or to the social security system; and, most surprising of all, there was no
discussion of the insurance factor. The latest editions of Salmond (the most recent edition
is the fifteenth) make some concession on the last point (see J. SALMOND, TE LAw oF
TORTS 31-39 (15th ed. R. Heuston ed. 1969)), but the criteria of relevance remain essentially
the same as before, with the result that most of the things which the injured citizen or his
adviser or other participants in compensation processes need to know are treated as ir-
relevant. Thus, Salmond has limited value as a tool of prediction for participants in tro-
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Up to this point there appears to be common ground between
demands for more efficient professional training and the desire for a
closer integration of law and the social sciences. Both involve the re-
jection of Langdellism as too narrow; both call for a broader approach;
both evidence a concern with the law in action. But these seductive
phrases all too easily conceal widely divergent standpoints and concerns.
Broader in what respect(s)? Interest in the law in action from what
standpoint(s)? The Wall Street lawyer, the gadfly reformer, the would-
be pioneer of an Empirical Science of Law, and the representative of
any one of the species of emerging legal worms might all give different
answers to these questions.
Failure to recognize this point has probably helped to sustain the
comfortable myth, central to the American Realist Movement, that the
protagonists of improved professional training and the leaders of the
integration movement were natural allies. The existence of a common
enemy and some overlap between their concerns is not disputed. But the
extent to which their criteria of relevance were shared and how far
they diverged has never been adequately explored. Analysis along these
lines may contribute something to explaining such phenomena as the
split between the Scientists and the Prudents at Columbia in 1928, the
disillusion and malaise that quickly succeeded the rise of the Realist
Movement, and the continuing confusion and sense of dissatisfaction
surrounding many contemporary debates about legal education, legal
research, and legal literature.52
Recent developments in academic treatment of the law of torts
cesses involving claims for compensation for personal injuries. It is also questionable
whether, without considerable supplementation, it is adequate as an educational work
for intending participants in those processes or for those who wish to understand the way
the system works in practice. Nor does it provide an adequate basis for evaluating the
system. From a wide variety of standpoints its basic limitation is that its criteria of rele-
vance are too narrow.
The authors (or editors) of such works may defend themselves by saying that they do
not hold themselves out as doing more than expounding the law as it is in a particular
field at a given moment in time. For example, in the preface to the first edition of Sal-
mond's work, the author stated: "I have endeavoured in this book to set forth the prin-
ciples of the law of Torts with as much precision, coherence and system as the subject
admits of, and with as much detailed consideration as is necessary to make the work one of
practical utility." Id. at v (lst ed. 1907) (Preface).
What is at issue is not whether such books achieve their objectives (although Salmond's
assumptions about practical utility are debatable), but how dominant a place in a nation's
legal literature and legal education should be accorded to works with such limited objec-
tives, and whether it is a healthy situation for a high proportion of the energies of out-
standing legal scholars to be devoted to the production of such works. See generally W.
Twining, Is Your Textbook Really Necessary?, 11 J. Soc'y PuB. TEACERS L. 81 (1970).
52 See generally works cited in note 48 supra.
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and accidents provide a concrete example of the unsystematic nature
of the post-Langdellian reaction. Most torts books and courses even
today provide striking examples of what Pound termed the divorce
between law in books and law in jaction. 53 Yet the works and the
courses survive and many of the responses to criticism of them look
more like palliatives than cures. There has, however, recently been a
spate of books on accident compensation which depart significantly
from the traditional model. Many are of excellent intellectual quality.5 4
These works are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with reform;
thus, they represent a move away from the standpoint of the judge
towards that of the legislator. Their criteria of relevance are closer
to those of the Bad Man, although they are by no means identical.
These works have generally been well received, but two contrasting
lines of criticism have been leveled at some of them. On the one hand
it has been pointed out that proponents of accident compensation
schemes have not paid sufficient attention to the vested interests and
political obstacles likely to prevent or delay the movement for reform.55
On the other hand it has been suggested that they fail to provide suffi-
cient guidance to those who wish to know how to operate within the
existing system." It is even arguable that traditional expository works
are of more value to the intending practitioner than this new genre
which claims, inter alia, to be more concerned with the law in action
than were its predecessors. Thus, ironically, these ostensibly more
realistic works are charged with lack of political realism from the
standpoint of the legislator, and with neglect of immediate practical
realities from the point of view of the practitioner. It is unnecessary
here to treat the merits of these criticisms. The relevant point is that
the movement away from the standpoint of the appellate judge or the
expositor of legal doctrine has not involved a simple switch to the
standpoint of the Bad Man or to any other single standpoint.
53 There has been too much abstract reasoning from attractive analogies of the
past and not enough testing of those analogies in the light of how they meet or fail
to meet the exigencies of reasonable expectations of men in the time and place.
Abstract ethics and abstract politics must be supplemented by comparative study
of the social and economic conditions from which their abstract theories are de-
rived and of those to which they are to be applied.
R. POUND, LAW FiNDING THRouGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON 47-48 (1960).
54 See, e.g., P. ArYAH, supra note 51; G. CALABRFs, Tnm CosTs OF AccmENTs (1970);
T. ISON, supra note 51; R. KErON & J. O'CoNNELL, BAsIc PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VicrIr (1965).
55 See, e.g., Greer, Book Review, 22 N. IR. L.Q. 554, 559 (1971) (review of P. A1TYAH,
supra note 51).
56 See, e.g., Walker, Book Review, Jumo. REv. 278 (1970) (review of P. ATIYAH, supra
note 51). See also Smith, Authors and Authority, 12 J. Soc'x PUB. TEAcEms L. 3 (1972).
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A brief glance at existing literature, such as practical manuals
on accident claims and defamation suits, which appears to be designed
specifically for the Bad Man's legal adviser, conveys the impression that
such literature is generally intellectually inferior to both the reform-
minded books and traditional textbooks. For this reason, if for no
other, this type of work is generally regarded as unsuitable for peda-
gogical purposes. Thus, even in an area in which significant intellectual
advances have been made, the needs of the Bad Man's adviser have
been catered to only incidentally.
What the Bad Man, the Good Citizen, and their legal advisers
need to know in order to act out their roles as participants in legal
processes is not coextensive with what other participants, such as judges
and advocates, need to know. And much of legal theory and legal
writing, as well as legal education, ignores their standpoints and their
needs. Attempts to make adjustments in the light of such complaints
have often been halfhearted and have tended to proceed on an inade-
quate theoretical basis. Nine pages on insurance in a recent edition
of Salmond on Torts57 represent little more than a placatory gesture.
Holmes's Bad Man concept contained the germ of a theoretical basis
for some practitioners' complaints. More fully developed, it could pro-
vide the basis for a systematic evaluation of and response to their de-
mands. It represents a striking example of the influence of assumptions
about standpoint on ways of approaching and thinking about law.
Holmes never developed a systematic theory for educating future
practitioners. One may confidently infer from "The Path of the Law"
and his other pronouncements that such an approach to legal educa-
tion would have had little appeal to him. It seems likely that he would
have rejected what might be termed "the rationalist model of formal
legal education."58 A mode of legal education which sets out methodi-
cally and single-mindedly to prepare students within the academy for
tasks which they would be likely to perform in real life would almost
inevitably have to contain a large element of the banausic. Even with
the support of a romantic and inflated view of the role of lawyers in
society (and backed by arguments that formal education should be
seen as a long term investment in highly transferable skills), we cannot
evade the fact that effective participation in legal processes almost al-
ways involves mastery of much that is specific, trivial, routine, dull, or
any combination of these. Holmes, on the other hand, shared the pre-
vailing high-minded and comfortable vision of the elite law school:
57 See J. SALmoND, TiH LAw OF Topus 81-39 (15th ed. R. Heuston ed. 1969).
58 See generally WHAT'S WRONG Wn THE LAW? 124-26 (M. Zander ed. 1970).
19731
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
"I say the business of a law school is not sufficiently described when
you merely say that it is to teach law, or to make lawyers. It is to teach
law in the grand manner, and to make great lawyers."5 9
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Holmes would have agreed
with those who believe that many of the lessons traditionally left to be
picked up in practice can be learned more efficiently and more quickly
within the academy. If any precise meaning can be attached to his
cryptic aphorisms on the life of the law and the role of formal educa-
tion, it is that the academy cannot and should not hold itself out as
providing more than a start to a lifelong process of self-education. He
believed that law schools should perform a role which is at once elevated,
limited in scope, and not subject to precise analysis. A rationalist Bad
Man theory of legal education would probably not have appealed to
him.
Holmes never worked out in detail the implications of his pro-
nouncements on legal education. His diagnosis was at best incomplete.
His prescriptions were scattered and vague, and he dropped only a
few very general hints about his views on educational priorities. He was
correct in his perception that the main weakness of Langdellism was
that it was too closely wedded to a single, and for many purposes in-
appropriate, standpoint. But he did not seriously attempt to identify
what standpoint or standpoints would provide the basis for a more
satisfactory theory of legal education. He probably sensed that an
approach to legal education based exclusively on the standpoint of the
Bad Man would be at least as defective as Langdellism. But he declined
to provide a coherent alternative theory, perhaps because he was skep-
tical of theorizing about education. This omission enabled him to beg
two of the most persistent questions facing American law schools: first,
to what extent and by what means formal legal education should be
wholeheartedly vocational in its orientation; and second, to what extent
preparation for legal practice and the development of law as a social
science are compatible objectives for a single institution. Much
59 O.W. HoLmES The Use of Law Schools, in CoLrmr GAL PAPERs 37 (1920).
No result is easy which is worth having. Your education begins when what is
called your education is over-when you no longer are stringing together the
pregnant thoughts, the "jewels five-words-long," which great men have given their
lives to cut from the raw material, but have begun yourselves to work upon the
raw material for results which you do not see, cannot predict, and which may be
long in coming,-when you take the fact which life offers you for your appointed
task.
O.W. HOLMES, Profession of the Law, in id. at 31.
Speaking before the Harvard Law School Association in 1886, Holmes remarked: "The
main part of intellectual education is not the acquisition of facts, but learning how to
make facts live." O.W. HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, supra at 36-37.
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of the history of the American law school since Holmes's day could be
written in terms of a recurring failure to face, let alone to resolve,
these issues. "The Path of the Law" brings to the surface the two main
ingredients of this central dilemma of American legal education: the
Bad Man model of vocational training and the idea of law as a social
science. Although Holmes identified the ingredients of the dilemma,
he failed to resolve it.
IV
THE BAD MAN AND THE BUST BooK
A pillar of the New England intellectual elite addressing poten-
tial members of the legal profession in 1897 and four young radicals
giving practical advice to members of the underground in 1971 seem
to belong to different worlds. The expressed aspiration of the former
was to "catch an echo of the infinite"; 60 that of the latter is to smash
the system.01 One function of Holmes's cynical acid is to strip value
judgments from legal analysis; the acid of The Bust Book is directed
at the whole structure of the legal system, not only at its claims to neu-
trality and impartiality. Holmes tended to dismiss radical socialism as
empty humbug;62 no doubt members of "the Movement" would use
stronger language to characterize the social order and the attitudes
represented by Holmes. To Frank, Holmes symbolized "the com-
pletely adult jurist";63 the new radical jurisprudence is still in its in-
fancy. 64 Despite these contrasts, I propose to argue that "The Path of
the Law" may provide a starting point for a dialogue between the
emergent jurisprudence of the radical left in the United States and the
60 The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it uni-
versal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in
your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.
The Path of the Law 478.
61 The judicial system in the United States is not a neutral institution. Although
the courts hide behind a cloak of judicial impartiality, they are an apparatus for
the preservation of the status quo-a society based on race, sex, and class exploita-
tion. The cop and the judge wear different uniforms, but they both serve the
same System we seek to destroy. Both the cop on the beat and the judge on the
bench will attempt to crush our Movement; we must understand the function of
each-and fight against both.
X. BouaN, B. GLiax, E. RAsKIN & G. RICHBACH, supra note 1, at 14.
62 Holmes's political views have been the subject of much debate. See S. KONEFSKY,
Tim LEGACY op HoLams AND BRANDEts 64-66 (1956).
68 J. FRANx, LAw AND THE MoDERN MIND 270-77 (1930).
04 It has, however, a formidable intellectual pedigree.
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bourgeois jurisprudence (as radicals might categorize it) which has
dominated American legal thought since Holmes.
It should not be necessary to labor the point that such a dialogue
is worth encouraging. The genre of literature represented by The Bust
Book presages the arrival of a new brand of radical jurisprudence
which deserves the serious attention of jurists, whether radical, re-
formist, or reactionary. 65 Of course, manuals like The Bust Book tend
to take for granted rather than to expound upon underlying ideological
assumptions; even the more theoretical writings of radical lawyers
presently tend toward exaggeration, crude simplification, and heavy
use of emotive terms which obfuscate rather than assist rational dis-
course. But it would be foolish to make stylistic puerility an excuse for
not taking seriously the challenging ideas that are emerging, or re-
emerging, from this quarter: that judicial impartiality is a myth which
cloaks the essential function of the courts as apparatus for maintain-
ing an unjust social order; that the function of bourgeois jurispru-
dence has been to legitimatize the existing order and to contribute to
the mystification rather than the demystification of law; that all trials
are political and that all prisoners are political prisoners; that talk of
"civil liberties" is a species of the Big Lie; and that civil libertarian
groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union function as para-
governmental organizations.66 Such assertions deserve careful analysis,
if only because they are gaining increasing currency among law students
and lawyers. The challenge they present to traditional juristic discourse
deserves, at the very least, a reasoned response. In the United States this
response needs to be set in the context of American legal thought in
general. The dominant historical position of Holmes in the American
tradition makes him one, but not the only, suitable starting point for
comparing and contrasting radical and bourgeois juristic ideas.67
It must be admitted that there are some important limitations to
using "The Path of the Law" for this purpose. In many respects
Holmes's essay and The Bust Book are hardly comparable; 68 the dates,
the circumstances, the objectives, and the style of each work, their re-
,5 The terminology adopted here is that of the radical left, who would probably
characterize Jeremy Bentham (and the author of this essay) as "reformist" and Holmes
as "reactionary."
66 See generally LAw AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW AND ORDEI AND
TBE COURTS (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971). This work also illustrates the tendency to rely heavily
on emotive terms.
67 Jeremy Bentham has recently begun to provide a similar starting point in the
United Kingdom. Lecture by Professor H.L.A. Hart, "Bentham and the Demystification
of the Law," London School of Economics, June 28, 1972.
68 See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
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spective audiences, and the only semi-articulate major premises of their
authors prima facie provide little basis for comparison. But on at least
two points there are significant links between the Bad Man and the
addressees of The Bust Book.
First, the criteria of relevance of the works are similar, although
not identical. Both works are concerned with the practical realities of
confronting the law as it is. There is a shared concern with predicting
events at various stages in certain kinds of legal processes which man-
dates a realistic picture of how the legal system in fact operates. But
there is an important difference between the works:
The non-conformist challenges the legitimacy of the social
norms he rejects while the criminal accepts the norms he violates.
The non-conformist aims to change the norms and the criminal is
primarily concerned with escaping the sanctioning force of existing
norms without proposing substitutes.... The criminal and the
revolutionary are linked by the inequities of society, the one re-
flecting and the other challenging them; the one deviant, the other
defiant.69
At several points The Bust Book illustrates the dilemma of those
who are obliged to participate in a system they seek to change. Con-
formance to the rules of the system may be seen as acceptance or even
reinforcement of it, but refusal to conform may be counter-productive.
This dilemma, although not shared by Holmes's Bad Man, is openly
recognized in The Bust Book.70
A second point of contact between the Bad Man and The Bust
Book relates to the Bad Man's amorality. As we have seen, one function
of the Bad Man in Holmes's argument was to dramatize the distinction
between law and morals. This distinction provides one basis for claims
69 Unpublished student essay by Timothy Chapman, University of Warwick, Coven-
try, England (quoted with permission of the author).
70 A conventional legal defense means using the facts and the law-technicalities,
rules of evidence, Constitutional rights-to win a case. It can be used alone, or
combined with a political defense.
This approach is useful when a good plea bargain has not been offered or
when you think you have a very good chance of winning.
Legal technicalities have also been used to delay final judgment on a case
until the political situation changed to the defendant's benefit. After the Colum-
bia University busts, the defense lawyers stalled until the new University ad-
ministration was appointed, which dropped the complaints against five hundred
of the students.
Using existing laws does tend to legitimate a legal system which we oppose.
Asking the judge to enforce those laws on our behalf reinforces the myth that
courts are neutral, and compliance with conventional courtroom procedures may
add to the sanctity of the law.
Nevertheless, at the present time, conventional legal defense does keep activists
out of jail and free to organize.
K. BOUIIN, B. GLicK, E. RAsaIN & G. RIICHBACH, sutpra note 1, at 92-93.
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to neutrality in analysis and description of the law as it is. At first sight
there appears to be a clash between this brand of legal positivism71
and the ideas of radicals who pour scorn not only on claims that exist-
ing legal orders are in fact neutral or impartial, but also on the idea
that legal analysis can ever be neutral or value-free. This raises ex-
tremely complex issues which have been much debated. Here I shall
content myself with making two points. First, the positions of Holmes
and the authors of The Bust Book are both more complex and closer
to each other on this issue than might at first appear. Holmes's insis-
tence on divorcing law and morals for the purposes of legal analysis
did not preclude his acceptance of the point that judgments of value
and considerations of policy have an important place in judicial rea-
soning. Indeed, he was one of the first to stress this theme. 72 Conversely,
much of the information in The Bust Book could be said to be neutral
in the sense that it is capable of verification by empirical means and
that it could be useful to a variety of people with different values pur-
suing different objectives. These examples at least serve to make the
elementary point that sweeping claims to, or denials of, neutrality need
to be treated with caution.
Insistence on the distinction between prescription and description
is indicative of a concern with demystification of law by jurists in the
Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence. 73 The main reason for this
insistence has been a concern with clarity of thought as a precondition
for describing, analyzing, and criticizing legal systems as they really
are. In different ways demystification of law has been a prominent
theme.in the writings of jurists as varied as Bentham, Holmes, Frank,
Llewellyn, and Hart. Here there is, prima facie, common ground be-
tween radical and orthodox jurisprudence. Ironically, the leading con-
temporary proponents of the demystification of the law (itself a eulo-
gistic phrase) tend to be among the worst offenders in their mystifying
use of question-begging epithets and other eulogistic and dyslogistic
terms. Like Blackstone, their cardinal error is to confuse propaganda
with analysis. If radical lawyers are to enter into meaningful dialogue
71 On the various meanings of "positivism," see Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HAxv. L RLv. 593, 601-02 (1958).
72 I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to
say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness and external deposit of
our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.
The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good
men. When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with
reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law.
The Path of the Law 459.
73 See Lecture, supra note 67.
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with bourgeois jurists they could well add Bentham's Book of Fallacies
to their shelf of handbooks, and could do very much worse than move
on from that to "The Path of the Law" as part of their progress to a
more mature radical jurisprudence.
ENVOI
Invulnerability to criticism is not a necessary quality of a classic.
Significant error is more characteristic of the genus. Does it contain
important insights? Do its errors and exaggerations suggest further in-
sights? Does it have something fresh to say to successive generations,
or is it as ephemeral as most legal writing? Judged by these criteria,
"The Path of the Law" easily passes the test. In arguing that legal
education and legal theory could benefit from a change of standpoinf,
Holmes identified a persistent source of dissatisfaction and perplexity
in American legal thought. He also provided a striking illustration of
the potential of standpoint as a tool of juristic analysis. By exaggerating
the importance of the task of prediction, he invited criticism which has
itself been revealing. The protean qualities of the Bad Man in his sub-
sequent existence serve to remind us of some neglected perspectives on
law. Floreat vir amoralis.
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